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I. INTRODUCTION
The most controversial amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requiring pre-discovery mandatory disclosure, became effective on December
1, 1993, after a House-passed version of the bill, H.R. 2814, enacted to kill Rule
26(a)(1), failed in the Senate. 1 The House passed the bill on November 3, 1993,
in order to eliminate the mandatory disclosure provision of Rule 26(a)(1) and
several other amendments from the package of rules under congressional
consideration.2 Amended Rule 26(a)(1) requires parties to exchange certain
core information prior to pretrial discovery without waiting for a discovery
request.3 Attorneys, who practice in federal courts, which have chosen not to
"opt out''4 of the disclosure requirements, will be under a duty to divulge the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of people "likely to have
1Randall Sambom, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6,1993, at 3,40.
2Randall Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain, NATL L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1, 26.
3 Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Rule Revisions a Mixed Bag, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23,1993, at S14.
4 Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of Trial Run, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1993, at 15 (arguing
that since federal districts can adopt their own version of mandatory disclosure by
"opting out" of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), there will be widespread
variation among the district courts).
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discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity
in the pleadings."5 Additionally, lawyers will be under a duty to furnish a copy
of, or the location of, relevant documents, reveal a computation of damages,
and provide for inspection of any insurance agreements under the new rule.
6
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court in fashioning the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right."7 This means that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must specifically
regulate the court's procedure, and not affect any substantive right applied in
the federal courts. Since the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934, the
Supreme Court has never found a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to be in
violation of the Enabling Act's prohibition on substantive rulemaking.8
The purpose of this note is to generally explain the problems associated with
Rule 26(a)(1), and to specifically examine whether it violates the Rules Enabling
Act's prohibition on affecting substantive rights. To illustrate the problem with
applying Rule 26(a)(1) to all cases, the note will examine mandatory disclosure
as it applies to civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The note
concludes that Rule 26(a)(1) infringes on substantive rights in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act; however, instead of invalidating the mandatory disclosure
rule entirely, federal courts should not apply Rule 26(a)(1) to cases brought
under § 1983 against defendant public officials.
The first section discusses Rule 26(a)(1) with a focus upon the impetus for
the amendment, the rulemaking process, the model upon which the rule was
formulated, and the criticism surrounding the enactment of mandatory
pre-discovery disclosure. The second section focuses on the limitations
imposed upon the Supreme Court in fashioning rules of procedure. The third
section explores whether the Supreme Court has exceeded its federal
rulemaking power in fashioning Rule 26(a)(1) with respect to civil rights cases
brought under § 1983. Finally, the fourth section discusses the trans-substantive
nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. RULE 26(a)(1)
A. Impetus for Rule 26(a)(1)
The call for a change in discovery came about as a result of the heightened
criticism surrounding the civil litigation system.9 When the discovery rules
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
6 Id.
728 U.S.C. § 2072(b)(1988).
8Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283, 1328 (1993).
9Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA.
L.REv. 1 (1992). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Symposium on Civil Justice Reform: Discovery
in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Un-
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were first promulgated in 1938, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure intended the rules to facilitate the full disclosure of material
information.10 The discovery rules seemed to have worked for the first thirty
years.11 However, in the mid-1970s problems of abusive discovery began to
surface.12 In 1976, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, head of the Pound
Conference, a body convened to evaluate the troubled state of litigation and
the problems associated with discovery, stated:
There is a very real concern in the legal community that the discovery
process is now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions, since any
material which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is
discoverable, seem to be the norm. Unnecessary intrusions into the
privacy of the individual, high costs to the litigants, and
correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a lever toward,
settlement have come to be part of some lawyers' trial strategy.
13
Widespread dissatisfaction with discovery lead to amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1980 and again in 1983.14 The 1980 amendment
created Rule 26(f), the provision establishing a discovery conference. 15 In 1983,
Rule 26(g), similar in form to Rule 11, authorized judicial power to impose
sanctions for discovery requests and responses that were unreasonably
burdensome or expensive given prior discovery and the issues in the case. 16
Despite this attempt at reform, the criticism surrounding discovery continued.
In August of 1991, then Vice-President Dan Quayle reiterated the same
concerns as the Pound Conference had addressed over a decade ago regarding
abusive discovery in his speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
founded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (arguing that civil litigation reform
resulted from hysteria in the media rather than reliable empirical research).
10 paul W. Green, Reassessment of the Lawyers' Discovery Responsibilities, 53 ALA. LAW.
278 (1992); see generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.1, at 380 (1st
ed. 1985) (explaining the history and purpose of modem discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
11William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery
Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 704 (1989) (stating that in a 1968 survey of lawyers, less
than ten percent of those responding complained of abusive discovery practices such
as excessive delay, expense, or harassment).
121d.
13 William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
14 William Schwarzer, Slaying the Monster of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure be More
Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (1991).
151d.
161d.
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Association in Atlanta, Georgia. 17 Placing much of the blame of the litigation
crisis upon the discovery process, Vice-President Quayle noted that over eighty
percent of the time and cost associated with litigation resulted from pretrial
discovery.18 Thus, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
(hereinafter Advisory Committee) responded to this avalanche of criticism by
proposing the most comprehensive amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
B. History of Amended Rule 26
The Advisory Committee initiated the rulemaking process by making a
proposal to alter the rules.19 In August of 1991, the debate over mandatory
disclosure exploded when the Advisory Committee circulated its second
proposal20 to amend Rule 26 to require mandatory pre-discovery disclosure of
the names and addresses of individuals who had information that was "likely
to bear significantly on any claim or defense."21 In accordance with The judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, the Advisory Committee held
two public hearings, one in Los Angeles in November of 1991 and the other in
Atlanta in February of 1992, to increase public input into the rulemaking
17Bell, supra note 9, at 9 (citing Vice-President Dan Quayle, Prepared Remarks to the
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1991) (transcript available
from the Vice-President's Office)).
18 Bell, supra note 9, at 10 (citing Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, A Report
from the President's Council on Competitiveness (Aug. 1991) (on file with the GA. L.
REV.)). One recommendation from the President's Council on Competitiveness was to
require limited automatic disclosure of certain basic or core information such as the
names and addresses of individuals likely to have information on the claims, defenses,
and location of documents relevant to the case. Id. at 10 n.23.
19 See generally Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure,
22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323 (1991) (describing the rulemaking process from historical to
modem times); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993) (describing the process of civil rule making in section I).
20 D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: An
Experiment Gone Awry, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. Jan. 1993, at 17. The Advisory Committee's
initial proposal was not an amendment to Rule 26, but rather an entirely new rule.
Proposed Rule 25.1 entitled "Disclosure" required parties to disclose within twenty-eight
days of the filing of an answer the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of those
people having personal knowledge of any fact alleged in the pleading. Additionally,
both parties were required to disclose the location and description of any tangible
evidence or relevant documents that had any bearing on any fact alleged in any pleading
and a computation of damages. The Advisory Committee modified this version and
proposed that the disclosure obligation be a new section of Rule 26 under the heading
Rule 26(a)(1). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C L. REV. 795 (1991) (critiquing Proposed
Rule 25.1).
21Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63 (1991).
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process. 22 The results from the Los Angeles public hearing were clearly not in
favor of the proposed amendment. The proposal for requiring mandatory
disclosure "provoked the most intense response from the bench and bar of any
proposed amendments."23 According to the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee's summary of comments, only a dozen out of over three hundred
submissions on the proposed amendment were in support of mandatory
disclosure.24
Instead of abandoning the mandatory disclosure proposal, the Advisory
Committee published another version of the disclosure rule.25 The new
revision provided for a differing standard of disclosure in which parties would
disclose information "reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence."26 Faced with even more intense opposition against the amendment,
the Advisory Committee abandoned the mandatory disclosure proposal in
March of 1992.27
Reversing its position of six weeks prior, the Advisory Committee
recommended on May 1, 1992, to amend Rule 26 to include a mandatory
disclosure provision to the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (hereinafter Standing Committee).28 The standard
for disclosure under this proposal, which is the standard that became effective
on December 1, 1993, requires parties to disclose the names and addresses of
individuals likely to have information that is "relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings."29 The second step in the five step
rulemaking process requires the Standing Committee to approve the proposed
amendments.30 The Standing Committee, after acknowledging the opposition
to the amendment, approved and forwarded the proposal to the Judicial
Conference at large for consideration without significant modification.31
2 2Campbell & Kulhman, supra note 20, at 17. Prior to 1988, there was concern that
there was insufficient public participation in the rulemaking process. Congress
responded to this concern by enacting legislation, entitled The Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act of 1988, to increase public input into the rulemaking process.
Bell, supra note 9, at 23.
23 Bell, supra note 9, at 28 (quoting Letter from the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman,
Standing Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992) (on file with the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judicial Conference of the United States)).
24 Bell, supra note 9, at 28.
2 5Campbell & Kulhman, supra note 20, at 17.
2 6Bell, supra note 9, at 33.
271d. at 34.
28Id. at 35.
2 9FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
30Samborn, supra note 1, at 40.
3 1Bell, supra note 9, at 39.
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On September 23, 1992, the Judicial Conference advanced the amendment
to the Supreme Court.32 According to Professor Linda Mullenix, the most
important decision made by the Supreme Court in the 1993 term was not
rendered in any case, but was its approval of the revisions of the federal
discovery rules.33 However, opposition to mandatory disclosure was also
apparent in the dissenting opinions of Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and David Souter.34 Justice Scalia voiced his opposition stating, "The
proposed radical reforms to the discovery process are potentially disastrous
and certainly premature."35 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court forwarded the
package of reforms to Congress, the final body in the rulemaking process, on
April 22, 1993.36
Congress had until November 1, 1993, to take action; if Congress failed to
take action before this time then the amendment would automatically become
effective on December 1, 1993.37 On November 3, 1993, the House of
Representatives passed a bill, the Civil Rules Amendment Act of 1993, H.R.
2814, ironically labeled "noncontroversial," to eliminate the controversial
mandatory disclosure rule from the package of reforms under consideration.38
The bill, blocked by Ohio Democratic Senator Howard Metzenbaum, died in
the Senate.39 Thus, on December 1, 1993, a package of the most comprehensive
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the pre-discovery
mandatory disclosure requirement, became effective.40
C. Mandatory Disclosure Model
The Advisory Committee, in the formulation of the pre-discovery
mandatory disclosure requirement, relied primarily upon two law review
32 1d. at 1; see generally Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal
Rulemaking, 46 JUDICATURE 250 (1963). 'The strength of the Federal Rules of [Civil]
Procedure is based not wholly or perhaps even largely upon their undoubted worth,
but upon the fact of their authorization and promulgation by the Supreme Court of the
United States." Clark, supra at 258.
33 Mullenix, supra note 3, at S14.
34 1d.
3 5Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 61 U.S.L.W. at
4393.
3 6Randall Sambom, On Sanctions, Discovery Rules Changes Go To Congress, NAT'L L.J.,
May 3, 1993, at 3.
3 71d.
3 8Sambom, supra note 2, at 1.
3 9Samborn, supra note 1, at 3.
40 Id. Professor Linda S. Mullenix questioned whether Congress has the power to
retract changes in rules after the rules take effect. Samborn, supra note 2, at 26.
[Vol. 43:115
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss1/10
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(a)(1)
articles, one written by Professor and United States Magistrate Wayne Brazil41
and the other written by Judge William Schwarzer.42 Professor Brazil, in his
seminal 1978 law review article, argued that "adversar[ial] pressures and
competitive economic impulses inevitably work to impair significantly, if not
frustrate completely, the attainment of the discovery system's primary
objectives."43 In order to better accomplish the function of gathering and
sharing evidence, Professor Brazil proposed a system of automatic disclosure
that would dismantle the adversarial process during discovery, and shift the
lawyer's obligations away from the pursuit of the client's interests towards the
court.44 According to Brazil, the formulation of a nonadversarial system during
pre-trial discovery will enhance the goal of gathering and sharing evidence.45
Ten years after the Brazil article, United States District Court Judge William
Schwarzer, formerly Director of the Federal Judicial Center, similarly
concluded that the adversarial nature under current discovery practices was
inimical to accomplishing the objective of discovery, namely disclosure. 46
Judge Schwarzer further explained that adversarial techniques are
counterproductive as it is "intuitively inconsistent with the adversarial ideal to
be helpful to one's opponent."47 Judge Schwarzer did not advocate a total
abandonment of the adversarial system, but rather a noncompetitive pretrial
system of disclosure. Judge Schwarzer, like Professor Brazil, proposed a rule
intended to shift the emphasis from discovery, a process, to disclosure, an
objective. 48 However, under Judge Schwarzer's proposed rule, disclosure
would be designed to restrict and to a great extent replace formal discovery.49
Under Judge Schwarzer's proposal, a litigant may only resort to formal
discovery after obtaining a court order, which requires a judicial finding that
there is "a reasonable basis for asserting the claim or defense," and that
equivalent information is not obtainable through informal investigation or the
opposing side's disclosures.50 Such a rule is intended to increase the efficiency
41 Wayne D. Brazil, T7e Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposal
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1303-04 (1978).
42 Bell, supra note 9, at 15.
43 Brazil, supra note 41, at 1303.
441d. at 1349.
45Id.
46 Bell, supra note 9, at 16.
47Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 714.
481d.
49Schwarzer, supra note 14, at 178. But see Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Timefor Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991) (critiquing
Judge Schwarzer's disclosure plan).
50 Schwarzer, supra note 14, at 180-81.
19951
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of the civil litigation system by eliminating the gamesmanship associated with
discovery requests.5 1
D. Requirements of Rule 26(a)(1)
The Rule 26 mandatory disclosure requirement is not as radical as the Brazil
or Schwarzer proposals as it is not intended to replace formal discovery. Rather,
the rule is intended to serve as the functional equivalent of court-ordered
interrogatories. 52 Parties will disclose four types of information that have
typically been obtained through formal discovery under Rule 26(a)(1).53 Unless
otherwise provided for by local rule or court order, parties will be under an
obligation to disclose the following within ten days after the meeting of the
parties at a discovery conference under subdivision (f) of Rule 26:54
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of
each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying
the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession,
custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under
Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or
protected from disclosure, on which such computation is based,
including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries
suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance
agreement which any person carrying on an insurance business may
be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in
the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy
the judgment.55
Under subparagraph (A), parties will be required to disclose all persons with
such information regardless of whether the testimony is damaging to the
disclosing party.56 Additionally, the identity of those individuals who may be
5 1Mullenix, supra note 20, at 809.
52 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes.
53Id.
541d.
551d.
561d.
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called as witnesses by either party must be disclosed.57 Parties should also
briefly indicate the subject matter on which said persons have knowledge.5 8
Subparagraph (B) requires parties to describe and categorize, to the extent
possible after an initial investigation, the contents and location of all relevant
documents and records, including computerized data and other forms of
electronically-recorded information.59 The rule does not require the production
of any documents at this stage, but in some circumstances it may be more
convenient to provide the document itself rather than a description of the
contents. The purpose of this disclosure is to allow both parties to later frame
their document requests, and to prevent disputes resulting from the wording
of the requests. Compliance with this section will not prevent parties from
claiming any privilege or work product protection once parties commence
with the production of documents under Rule 34.60
Disclosure under subparagraphs (A) and (B) is limited to information that
is "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. "61 The
Advisory Committee warns that parties should apply the disclosure
requirement with common sense and in light of the purpose of the rule which
is to accelerate the basic exchange of information and to eliminate the excessive
paperwork associated with requesting such core information.62 Thus, "the
greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more
complete should be the listing of potential witnesses and types of documentary
evidence."63
Both subparagraphs (C) and (D) require parties to produce documents.64
Subparagraph (C) requires parties to produce the documents supporting a
claim for damages or monetary relief that are reasonably available to it and are
not protected by work product or privilege.65 This disclosure is the functional
equivalent of a Rule 34 standing request for production. 66 Finally,
subparagraph (D) requires the disclosure of liability insurance policies.67
57FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes.
58 d.
59Id.
601d.
6 11d.
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes.
631d.
64 d.
651d.
661d.
6 7FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes.
1995]
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E. Criticisms of Rule 26(a)(1)
Although the Advisory Committee's proposal was not as radical as the Brazil
or Schwarzer proposals, there was intense opposition from a coalition made
up of a wide spectrum of unlikely allies, including both plaintiff and defense
oriented groups, the American Bar Association, and the United States Justice
Department.68 One problem that critics have identified is the potential clash
between Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26.69 Under
the notice pleading requirement of Rule 8, a pleader has only to make a "short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."70
However, amended Rule 26 requires disclosure of information based upon facts
that are "alleged with particularity in the pleadings. 71 Thus, both rules seem
to be at odds with one another. The result from this inconsistency will be an
end to notice pleading as the plaintiff will draft a specific complaint in order to
trigger the defendant's disclosure obligation, and the defendant will likewise
tailor a specific answer since the answer will also determine the plaintiff's
disclosure obligations.72
Additionally, parties will be in disagreement as to how much information
must be disclosed in the pleadings.73 Parties claiming that they were not
required to disclose the information will rely upon notice pleading in Rule 8
while the other side will counter by arguing that the opposing party did not
plead with particularity as required by Rule 26.74
Another problem closely associated with the vague standard of disclosure
required under Rule 26(a)(1) is the inevitable increase in motion practice and
the overproduction of documents. 75 Since parties will not have discovery
requests from the opposing side, there will be uncertainty as to what
68Harrison Osborne, Sweeping Changes for Federal Court Discovery, MASS. LAWS.
WKLY., Dec. 6, 1993, at 1.
69J. Stratton Shartel, Litigators Voice Numerous Objections to Proposed Discovery Rule
Changes, INSIDE LITIG., Dec. 1992, at 25.
70FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
71FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
72 Shartel, supra note 69, at 25. Loren Kieve, an attorney with the Washington D.C.
firm Debevoise & Plimpton, says that defendants will no longer use denials such as
"without knowledge or information." Id. Instead, defendants will frame their answers
more specifically in order to forceplaintiffs to disclose the required relevant information.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75Bell, supra note 9, at 41. Canadian courts have experienced an increase in motion
practice concerning the appropriate scope of disclosure required under their
pre-discovery mandatory disclosure rule in spite of the fact that Canadian courts require
quite specific pleadings. The Canadian experience indicates that mandatory
pre-discovery disclosure may have the opposite effect of increasing the time and cost
associated with civil litigation. Campbell & Kulhman, supra note 20, at 21.
[Vol. 43:115
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information must be disclosed.76 The opposing party and the court may view
the standard of disclosure differently than the disclosing party.77 As a result of
this ambiguity, motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12,
motions for protective orders under Rule 26(c), and motions for sanctions
under Rule 37 will increase.78 Motions to dismiss or motions for a more definite
statement may be filed more frequently by defendants who will be under a
duty to automatically disclose information within fifty-six to ninety-six days
of the filing of the answer.79
In order to gain extra time, defendants may strategically use such motions
to delay automatic disclosure. 80 These motions will lead to more delay as
plaintiffs will be forced to respond with more specificity in their pleadings.81
It is likely that there will also be an increase in motions for protective orders
under Rule 26(c) since both parties will try to seek protection from unclear
interpretations of the amount of information that is "relevant" to the opponent's
pleadings.82 Motions for sanctions under Rule 37 will also increase as a result
of pre-discovery disclosure. After the initial disclosure phase and the
commencement of discovery, parties will undoubtedly gain information that
they will argue should have been produced during the disclosure phase.83
An additional problem with the vague disclosure standard is the likelihood
that it will cause an overproduction of marginally relevant information.84
Lawyers may use disclosure as a strategic weapon employed to overwhelm a
less equipped adversary with an abundance of information.85 Lawyers may
also fear sanctions and produce more documents than are necessary.86 Thus,
the ambiguous language of the disclosure requirement will lead to an increase
76 Campbell & Kulhman, supra note 20, at 19.
771d.
78 BeU, supra note 9, at 42-43.
791d. at 43 n.163. Bell explains,
Determining the timing of disclosure is itself problematic. Disclosure is
required 10 days before the meeting of the parties under subdivision (0,
which is to be held 14 days before a scheduling conference is held or a
scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), which requires that a schedu-
ling order be entered within 90 days after the first appearance of a
defendant or, if earlier, within 120 days after an answer has been served
on any defendant.
Id.
801d. at 43.
81Id.
82Id.
83 Bell, supra note 9, at 43.
841d.
85Id.
86Id.
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in the time and costs associated with litigation. The unresolved question that
remains to be answered is whether the increase in the new time and monetary
costs associated with mandatory disclosure will be less than those the rule was
designed to limit.
Practitioners have also cited as a concern the conflict that disclosure
requirements will have on their ethical responsibilities to their clients.87 Under
professional responsibility codes, lawyers must act zealously for their clients
within the bounds of the law, but Rule 26(a)(1) creates a conflict between
lawyers' duties to their clients and their duties to the court.88 When lawyers
comply with the disclosure requirement they will be going against the interest
of their client by aiding the opposing side in the formulation of their case.89
William T. Hangley, co-chairperson of the American Bar Association litigation
section's federal procedure committee, envisions the following dialogue
between attorneys and their clients: "Attorney: You have to tell me all the facts
and about all the important documents. If I think they are relevant to a
well-drafted pleading, I will give them to the other side. Client: That's crazy!"90
Furthermore, savvy clients may not disclose valuable information to their
attorneys for fear that the attomey will divulge the information to the opposing
side.91
Another distinct but closely related concern for practitioners is the effect that
the disclosure requirement will have upon the work product doctrine.92
Litigators argue that the work product doctrine will be weakened as attorneys'
impressions of the case are revealed through forced disclosure of witnesses and
documents that the attorney predicts relate to the case.93
Plaintiffs' lawyers also express concern over Rule 26(a)(1) because in
personal injury and public interest types of litigation plaintiffs typically lack
the necessary information to prove their cases. 94 The bulk of information is
usually held by the defendants, who naturally oppose relinquishing the
information. If plaintiffs are required to fully disclose all the information they
have prior to formal discovery, then there may be a tendency on the district
87 Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139,142-43 (1993).
88Id.
891d. Lynn Pasahow, who has co-authored a book with Judge Schwarzer on
discovery, disagrees that Rule 26 will create any ethical problems because even under
the old Rule 26 when a party received a discovery request that was relevant, but against
the client's interest it still had to produce the information. She says the difference
between the old rule and the revision is more of one of form than substance. Shartel,
supra note 69, at 26.
90 0sborne, supra note 68, at 16.
911d.
921d.
9 3Campbell & Kulhman, supra note 20, at 20.
9 4Tobias, supra note 87, at 143.
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court judge's part to limit the scope of discovery to those issues for which the
plaintiff already has support.95
Critics seem to agree that the standard requiring lawyers to disclose
information "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings" 96 will lead to an increase in the cost and time of discovery. Rule
26(a)(1) may increase costs to litigants in cases that might have been settled
prior to the triggering of disclosure.97 Additionally, the increase in motion
practice will cost clients more time and money.98
Finally, critics of mandatory disclosure take issue with the implementation
of Rule 26(a)(1) prior99 to evaluating the results 100 of the local rules experiments
pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.101 The Civil Justice Reform
Act requires, among other things, that each of the ninety-four United States
District Courts assess litigation conditions in their districts and adopt plans to
increase the efficiency of civil litigation in their district courts.102 In July of 1992,
the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management, designated thirty-four districts as Early Implementation District
Courts (hereinafter EIDC).103 The EIDCs each submitted their civil justice plans
by December 31, 1991. The Civil Justice Reform Act required the remaining
sixty districts to submit their plans by December 31, 1993.104 The Act suggests
95 Id.
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
97 John Heller, Excerpts from the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans Pursuant
to the Civil Justice Reform Act, Q214 ALI-ABA 515, 569 (1993).
98 Bell, supra note 9, at 49.
99SenatorJoseph Biden takes issue with the criticism that the proposed amendments
should not have been passed prior to the results of the Civil Justice Reform Act stating
that the vitality of the Act "is not dependent on the outcome of the debate on the
proposed changes to the discovery rules." See Statement of Chairman Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. on the Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Submitted to The
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, July 28, 1993.
10OMullenix, supra note 3, at S14. Local rules experiments under the Civil Justice
Reform Act will be concluded on December 31,1995. Randall Samborn, Administration
Opposes New Disclosure Rule, NAT'L L. J., July 26,1993, at 5.
101judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). The
Civil Justice Reform Act, also known as the Biden Bill, is the culmination of a joint task
force study from the Brookings Institute and the Foundation for Change which
concluded that the high cost of litigation effectively limited access to the federal courts
to deep-pocket litigants. See generallyJeffreyJ. Peck, User's United: The Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 105 (1991).
102 Heller, supra note 97, at 521.
103 Tobias, supra note 87, at 144.
1041d. The following districts were designated as EIDC: Alaska, E.D. Arkansas, E.D.
California, N.D. California, S.D. California, Delaware, S.D. Florida, N.D. Georgia, Idaho,
S.D. Illinois, N.D. Indiana, S.D. Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, W.D. Michigan,
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several principles that may be considered by the districts in formulating their
expense and delay reduction plans, including the use of cooperative discovery
devices. 105 Of the thirty-four EIDCs, twenty included some form of a
mandatory pre-discovery disclosure requirement; however, these district
courts adopted disclosure standards that differed from Rule 26(a)(1) since at
the time of their adoption the Advisory Committee was considering a prior
proposal. 106 The variation among local rules and Rule 26(a)(1) fosters
disuniformity and confusion throughout the federal system.107 Judges in
EIDCs have expressed concern over how to mesh their district's rules with the
federal rule.108 Attorneys practicing in multiple districts, such as government
litigators, also raise the issue of having to deal with conflicting discovery
procedures.109 According to Professor Tobias, the tension between varied local
rules and Rule 26 is good "in terms of experimentation, but it just makes it
difficult in terms of practice."110
Given the overwhelming amount of criticism surrounding the passage of
Rule 26(a)(1), one cannot help but wonder why the rule was enacted. The
strongest argument favoring mandatory disclosure11' seems to be the
perceived need for a change in the discovery process.112"According to Judge
Phillips, '[t]he pressures have been mounting against discovery and this
[mandatory pre-trial disclosure] is the only and best idea we have, to create a
different environment." 113
Montana, New Jersey, E.D. New York, S.D. New York, N.D. Ohio, W.D. Oklahoma,
Oregon, E.D. Pennsylvania, W.D. Texas, E.D. Texas, S.D. Texas, Utah, Virgin Islands,
E.D. Virginia, N.D. West Virginia, S.D. West Virginia, E.D. Wisconsin, W.D. Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. Heller, supra note 97, at 573.
105The district courts may choose to include the following principles in their expense
and delay reduction plans: differentiated case management, early and ongoing control
of pretrial matters, special treatment of cases designated as "complex," voluntary and
cooperative discovery, certification of discovery motions, and alternative dispute
resolution. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (Supp. V 1993).
106Tobias, supra note 87, at 144.
1071d. at 145.
108Samborn, supra note 2, at 26.
109Tobias, supra note 87, at 145.
11OSamborn, supra note 2, at 26.
111 See Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992)
(arguing in favor of automatic disclosure).
112BelU, supra note 9, at 56-57.
1131d. (quoting Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2 (Nov. 29-Dec. 1,
1990) (on file with the Georgia Law Review)).
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III. LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL RULEMAKING
Congress delegated its rulemaking power to regulate procedure in the
federal courts to the Supreme Court in the first sentence of the 1934 Rules
Enabling Act,1 14 which confers in the Supreme Court the power to "prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure... in the United States district courts
... and courts of appeals."115 A conflict arises in this situation since the Court
may be called upon to determine the validity of rules which the Court itself has
promulgated.
Although the first sentence of the Rules Enabling Act seems to grant the
Supreme Court unlimited discretion in promulgating rules which regulate
practice in the federal courts, the Court's power is limited by congressional
retention of the ability to reject rules which it does not favor.116 In order for a
rule to become effective by December 1, under current practice, the Supreme
Court must forward the proposal to Congress by May 1 of the same year,
thereby providing a seven month period in which Congress may accept or
reject the proposed rule.1 17 For example, Congress could have eliminated Rule
26(a)(1) if H.R. 2814 had not failed in the Senate.
The second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act118 also purports to limit the
Supreme Court's power to promulgate federal rules119 by requiring that the
Court not adopt rules that "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right."12 0 However, Supreme Court interpretation of this sentence of the Rules
Enabling Act, or more correctly the failure to interpret this sentence, seems to
augment rather than limit the Court's power. The correct interpretation of this
provision has been the subject of much controversy and confusion among
commentators. 12 1 One area of disagreement focuses on whether and to what
extent the second sentence prohibiting modification of substantive rights
differs from the first sentence requiring rules to be procedural. 122 In other
words, does the prohibition on affecting substantive rights simply reiterate the
11428 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988); Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L. J. 281, 283 (1989). Some commentators argue that the
Supreme Court has inherent power to promulgate rules to govern the procedure in the
courts. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1116 (1982).
11528 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988).
116Karen N. Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 1039,1040 (1993).
1171d.
11828 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988).
119Moore, supra note 116, at 1042.
12028U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988); see United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-91 (1941).
121Moore, supra note 116, at 1042.
122/d.
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requirement that the Supreme Court only fashion procedural rules?123 Or, in
the alternative, can a rule which satisfies the first sentence as being procedural
fail under the second sentence by affecting substantive rights?124 Another
aspect of the controversy surrounding this provision of the Rules Enabling Act
is whether Congress intended the restriction on affecting substantive rights to
further federalism principles or separation of power principles. 125 Is the
restriction on affecting substantive rights designed to limit the federal
government's encroachment on rights granted by the states to its citizens or is
the purpose of the provision to enable Congress to limit the power of the
Supreme Court in fashioning rules?126
The two major Supreme Court decisions construing the Rules Enabling Act
have avoided the controversial issue of whether the second sentence of the Act
imposes further limitations on the Court's power to promulgate rules by
collapsing the two requirements into one.127 In Sibabach v. Wilson & Co.128 the
Court stated that the test to determine the validity of a federal rule is "whether
a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them."129 By testing the validity of a rule
under this standard, the Court is saying that if a rule satisfies the first sentence
of the Act by being a procedural rule, then it also satisfies the second sentence
by not affecting substantive rights.130 In other words, the Court has not
accepted that a rule may be procedural and simultaneously affect substantive
rights.131 By asking the wrong question, the Court is able to avoid defining
substantive rights beyond the notion that it does not mean "important" or
"substantial."132 The Court avoids this conflict because if it were to begin to
invalidate federal rules based on a violation of the Rules Enabling Act's
prohibition on affecting substantive rights there would be catastrophic harm
to the federal system. Every rule would inevitably be challenged as being
violative of the Act by abridging, enlarging, or modifying a substantive right.
1231d.
124 Professor Paul Carrington argues that § 2072(b) is excess verbiage and is not
necessary since the Supreme Court cannot make substantive rules by means other than
writing opinions in "cases or controversies." Carrington, supra note 114, at 287.
125 Moore, supra note 116, at 1042.
1261d.
12 7Marcia L. Finkelstein, Comity and Tragedy: The Case of Rule 407, 38 VAND. L. REV.
585, 594 (1985).
128312 U.S. 1 (1941).
129 /d. at 14.
130 Finkelstein, supra note 127, at 594.
131Id.
132 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11-14.
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The Court would be on a slippery slope by having to define which rights were
substantive and which were not, and which were abridged, enlarged, or
modified as opposed to being only "incidentally" 33 affected. Furthermore, the
authority of the Court would diminish because invalidating rules, which the
Court itself promulagated, would be an admission of incompetency. Therefore,
by simply avoiding the issue the Court is able to maintain control over its
rulemaking power.
More than twenty years later, in Hanna v. Plumer134 the Court once again
bypassed the issue of defining substantive rights135 and chose to rely upon the
Sibbach "really regulates procedure" test to uphold the validity of the challenged
rule. However, the Court did find that there is a presumption of validity for
any rule that has been promulgated properly by the enabling process.136 To this
date the Court has never rejected a federal rule as being violative of the Rules
Enabling Act.137 Even though neither Sibbach nor Hanna resolve the issue of
what constitutes a substantive right, the Court has acknowledged that a federal
rule should be invalidated if it affects a substantive right. 138
Although the majority in Hanna did not explicate a test for determining what
constitutes a substantive right, Justice John Marshall Harlan, in his
concurrence, formulated his own standard. Justice Harlan characterized the
majority standard, which he termed the "arguably procedural ergo
constitutional" 139 test, as being far too deferential to the federal rules. The
Harlan test attempts to differentiate between those "rules which are part of the
133 Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
134380 U.S. 460 (1965).
135 Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Statute:
Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830-31 (1985).
1361d. at 831. See CHARLES A. WRicHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509
(1982). Wright's treatise explains:
By virtue of this process, the Rules, once they have become effective carry
a presumptive validity; any possible intrusions upon substantive rights
presumably have been thoroughly considered; whatever balancing is
required between procedural objectives and substantive policy concerns,
it may be assumed, already has been done.
Id. at 146-47.
13 7Mullenix, supra note 8, at 1328; see also Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enter., 111 S. Ct. 922,933-35 (1991) (challenging Rule 11); Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149,162-63 (1973) (challenging Rule 48); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
464-65 (1965) (challenging Rule 4(d)(1)); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112-14
(1964) (challenging Rule 35(a)(1)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,433-35
(1956) (challenging Rule 54(b)); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
445 (1946) (challenging Rule 4(f)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)
(challenging Rule 35).
138 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (stating that Rule 4(f) may have incidental effects on
substantive rights but that itself is not enough to invalidate the rule).
139Id. at 476.
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... legal rights to be applied. from those rules which structure the process
for trying claims to such rights."140 Under Harlan's approach the focus of the
inquiry shifts from the "use of rules in the courtroom to their use as guides for
'primary decisions respecting human conduct' outside of the courthouse."141
Another test for determining what constitutes a substantive right for the
purpose of determining whether the Supreme Court has overstepped its
federal rulemaking power has been formulated by Dean John Hart Ely.142 In
Dean Ely's seminal article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,143 he defines a
substantive right as "a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons,
for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency
of the litigation process."144 Thus, under the Ely test, there must be a
determination of the purposes of the right involved. Although lower courts
have not readily accepted the Harlan or Ely test to determine whether federal
rules abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights, the tests can prove useful
for those courts which give effect to the second sentence of the Rules Enabling
Act.145 An application of these tests for determining whether Rule 26(a)(1)
abridges a substantive right will be explored following a brief discussion of §
1983 actions.
IV. SECTION 1983 ACTIONs
The cause of action created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983146 provides for a broad federal
remedy for individuals who have been deprived of their federal rights by
persons acting under color of state law.147 Section 1983 does not itself create
140Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie
Doctrine, 85 YALE L. J. 678, 695 (1976).
141Id.
142Note, supra note 135, at 833.
14387 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
1441d. at 725.
145 See McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. Cim Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245 (D.C. Fla. 1977)
(accepting Ely's argument that a rule can be both procedural and still be invalid as
affecting substantive rights).
146 See generally STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITGATION IN STATE COURTS §§
2.1-2.6 (1993) (Release #1010/93) (explaining the remedial attributes of § 1983); William
Hawkins, 12 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 355 (1988) (discussing the elements of § 1983 cases).
147 The entire text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) is as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
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any substantive rights, it merely creates a procedural device through which a
party may seek relief for the deprivation of a constitutional right.148
Section 1983, the current version of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was
primarily enacted in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against
private conduct.149 More specifically, the statute was necessary to compel state
authorities to control the widespread violence of Klu Klux Klan members. 150
In 1871, the statute did not create much debate; 151 however, as the use of § 1983
increased over the years, 152 some critics began to argue that the statute was
being used for situations that the 1871 Congress did not intend.153 For example,
in Parratt v. Taylor,154 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., complained that § 1983 has
already "burst its historical bounds."155 But others, including Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, argued that § 1983 was necessary and served as "a symbol and
working mechanism for all of us to protect the constitutional liberties we
treasure."
156
A. Requirements of Section 1983 Cause of Action
In order to establish a civil rights violation using the procedural mechanism
of § 1983, a plaintiff must generally satisfy two elements (some courts however
require the plaintiff to prove causation): (1) "the plaintiff must allege that some
person has deprived him of a federal right," and (2) "he must allege that the
person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or terri-
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be consid-
ered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
148Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in the Ohio Courts: An Introduction for
Ohio Lawyers and Judges, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 407 (1993).
149For a legislative history of § 1983 see the following cases: Patsy v. Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Ortero, 426 U.S.
572 (1976); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also Note, Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1141-56 (1977).
1 5 0 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES 6 (1986).
15 1Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,665 (1978).
152 Steinglass, supra note 148, at 409 n.7.
153 Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 150, at 7.
154451 U.S. 527 (1981).
155Id. at 554 (Powell, J., concurring).
156Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 29 (1985).
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torial law."157 Plaintiffs may allege a deprivation of a federal right by
demonstrating a violation of a right protected by the federal Constitution or a
federal statute.158 Given the original purpose of § 1983, to enforce blacks'
Fourteenth Amendment rights, many courts were reluctant to extend § 1983
beyond claims based upon Fourteenth Amendment violations.159 However,
the Supreme Court in Dennis v. Higgins,160 held that dormant commerce clause
claims were actionable under § 1983.161 The conclusion to be drawn from the
Dennis Court is that § 1983 claims are not limited to Fourteenth Amendment
cases.162
Additionally, plaintiffs may also satisfy the first requirement necessary to
establish a claim under § 1983, by alleging a violation of a federal statute.163
The Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot,16 4 construed the language "and laws"
in the phrase "deprivation of... rights... secured by the Constitution and
laws"165 to mean that § 1983 applies to violations of federal statutes. However,
the Supreme Court has limited the availability of § 1983 when Congress has
explicitly provided for a remedy in the statute.166
In order to maintain a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must also
allege that the defendant was acting under color of law.167 The Supreme Court
has broadly construed this requirement to include conduct that is unauthorized
by state law in addition to conduct that is authorized by state law. Thus, the
Supreme Court has stated that an official's "[mlisuse of power, possessed by
157Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,640 (1980). Accord Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
140 (1979); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,155 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
158 Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 150, at 8.
159Steinglass, supra note 148, at 418.
160498 U.S. 439 (1991).
161Steinglass, supra note 148, at 418.
162Dennis, 498 U.S. at 463. Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion says of the
majority that their "logic extends far beyond the Commerce Clause and creates a whole
new class of § 1983 suits derived from Article I." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
163 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). Accord Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985);
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,140 n.3 (1979).
164448 U.S. 1 (1980).
16542 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
16 6Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981).
16742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see generally Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color
of" Law, 91 MUCH. L. REV. 323 (1992).
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virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."168
B. Immunity
In most § 1983 cases, the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant government
official personally liable for monetary damages.169 Section 1983, does not
expressly provide for any immunities that government officials may claim to
defeat liability; however, the Supreme Court has consistently taken the position
that the 1871 Congress intended the common law immunities, existent in 1871,
to apply to § 1983 cases absent any specific provision to the contrary.170 Thus,
government officials may be able to defeat personal liability by asserting a
common-law immunity.
Government officials will be entitled to either an absolute or qualified
immunity depending upon the nature of the official's governmental
function.171 Immunities in § 1983 actions are immunities from suit, not merely
from judgments.172 Absolute immunity "bars a suit at the outset and frees the
defendant official of any obligation to justify his action" while qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense173 that will protect an official from liability
if the official can prove that a reasonable official would not have known of the
illegality of the conduct in question.174 Determining whether the defendant is
entitled to absolute or qualified immunity, if any at all, based upon the nature
of the official's function, is known as a "functional approach" to immunity
law.175 Under a functional approach, the Supreme Court has recognized that
judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity.176
However, the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald177 cautioned that absolute
immunity will only apply to officials who were performing the recognized acts
necessary to their official capacity.178 Thus, a judge performing a judicial task
may be entitled to absolute immunity for that judicial function, but may only
1 68United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
169Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 150, at 141.
17OPierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
171Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 150, at 143 (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325
(1983); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982)).
1 72 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
1 73 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
1 74 Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 150, at 143 (internal citation omitted).
175 d. at 810; see generally Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumer Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980)
(providing an illustration of the functional approach).
176457 U.S. at 811.
177457 U.S. 800 (1982).
178Id.
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be entitled to qualified immunity for administrative or executive functions.179
There is a strong presumption against the use of absolute immunity and most
§ 1983 defendants are only entitled to claim a qualified immunity.1 80
In Wood v. Strickland,18 1 the Supreme Court defined qualified or good faith
immunity in § 1983 cases using subjective and objective components. The
subjective prong referred to "permissible intentions" and the objective prong
referred to the presumption of knowledge of and respect for "basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights."182 Thus, an official would not be entitled
to qualified immunity if the official "knew or reasonably should have known
that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiffi, or if he took the action with the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury .... 183
In Harlow the Supreme Court redefined qualified immunity leaving intact
only the objective prong of the test.184 The Court rejected the subjective
component of the test since judicial inquiry into the official's motivation
through broad ranging discovery would be disruptive of effective
government.185 Under the Harlow test, government officials performing
discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity when it can be
established that the official's conduct did not violate "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."186
In Anderson v. Creighton,18 7 the Supreme Court stated that in order for a right
to be clearly established, "[t]he 'contours' of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right . . . [and] in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be
apparent."188 Thus, under Anderson, a plaintiff, in order to defeat the
defendant's defense of qualified immunity, must prove a violation of a clearly
established right at the time of the act in question.189 Under this standard,
179Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 150, at 143.
180Steinglass, supra note 148, at 449.
181420 U.S. 308 (1975).
1821d. at 322.
183Id.
184457 U.S. at 818.
1851d. at 817.
186/d. at 818.
187483 U.S. 635 (1987).
188 d. at 640.
189Elliot v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338,341 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1121 (1992).
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courts will be required to define the right with a high degree of specificity 190
and defendant public officials will be given the benefit of legal doubts.191
Defendant public officials must raise the defense of qualified immunity in
the pleadings 192 because it is a kind of defense to be asserted before trial, not
at trial. The Supreme Court in Siegert v. Gi~ley,193 in clarifying the structure for
analyzing qualified immunity, stated that once the defendant raises the defense
of qualified immunity, "[oin summary judgment, the judge appropriately may
determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred .... Until this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed."194 The
Siegert Court, noting that the qualified immunity defense is a threshold
question, further stated,
[A] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff is 'clearly established' at
the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the
plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. Decision
of this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to weed out
suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly
claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming
preparation to defend the suit on its merits.
195
Thus, under Harlow, the court must determine the qualified immunity issue
and stay discovery, except in limited circumstances as the Anderson Court
suggests, until the issue has been determined. 19 6
V. VALIDITY OF RULE 26(a)(1)
There is a strong presumption, indeed one that has not been overcome, that
all federal rules that are promulgated according to proper procedure are valid
under the Rules Enabling Act.19 7 Under the Hanna majority test which upholds
a rule that "really regulates procedure," Rule 26(a)(1) clearly passes muster. The
Rule prescribes the manner in which parties must exchange certain core
information within the federal court system. The purpose of Rule 26(a)(1) is to
190Steinglass, supra note 148, at 453.
1911d.
192 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
193500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991).
194 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982).
195Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.
196Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. But see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987)
(acknowledging that limited discovery may be necessary when parties allege differing
facts prior to resolving the qualified immunity issue on a motion for summary
judgment).
197 Mullenix, supra note 8, at 1328.
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expedite the discovery process and create a better exchange of information
which relates to the procedure of the courts.
Lower courts,198 which have chosen to construe § 2072(b) as a limitation on
the Supreme Court's power to fashion rules, unlike the high Court, have found
that federal rules that regulate procedure can still be invalid if they affect
substantive rights.199 Since the Court has refused to engage in defining what
constitutes a substantive right, except stating that it is not merely "important"
or "substantial,"200 lower courts, which choose to give effect to the second
sentence of the Rules Enabling Act, should turn to the formulations by Justice
Harlan and Dean Ely to determine When a rule affects a substantive right.
Qualified immunity may be characterized as a procedural device, a
substantive right, or both. Even if qualified immunity is a procedural device
the Rules Enabling Act may still be violated if qualified immunity is also a
substantive right because Rule 26(a)(1) infringes upon this right by requiring
mandatory disclosure before the resolution of the threshold issue of qualified
immunity.
Under the Harlan test, the inquiry focuses on the use of the rule outside the
courtroom as a guide for making "primary decisions respecting human
conduct. "201 Although qualified immunity, the right not to be tried, may be
viewed as a procedural device, the rule also affects litigants outside the
courtroom by altering their "primary" behavior. The rule which threatens
discovery prior to a resolution of the availabilty of qualified immunity may
alter the defendant's behavior. Defendants may view their right to qualified
immunity as so crucial to the performance of their duties as public officials that
without the protection of qualified immunity, people may be discouraged from
seeking public positions for fear of the burdens of discovery. Thus, under the
Harlan test the right to qualified immunity is substantive as it shapes the
"primary" behavior of litigants outside of the courtroom.
Furthermore, qualified immunity is also a substantive right under the test
formulated by Dean Ely. According to this test, a substantive right is "a right
granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes
not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process."202 The
purpose of qualified immunity is to strike a balance between deterring public
officials from depriving plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and protecting
public officials from liability so that they do not become overly preoccupied
198See Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956)(holding Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(a)(1) invalid for abridging plaintiff's substantive right to bring an action
to trial on the merits).
19 9Finkelstein, supra note 127, at 598.
20 0Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11.
201Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475.
202 Note, supra note 135, at 833.
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with the fear of litigation thereby crippling performance of their duties.203 In
a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Elliott v. Perez,204 the court stated that "[t]he
public goals sought by official immunity are not procedural. Indeed, they go
to very fundamental substantive objectives." 20 5 These substantive objectives
include protecting public officials from the disruptive burden of litigation so
that they may effectively perform their duties.
If the reader accepts qualified immunity as a substantive right, then it is
possible to understand why Rule 26(a)(1) burdens this right. The defense of
qualified immunity is a defense that defendants assert prior to trial,2 06 thus,
any pre-discovery mandatory disclosure prior to court resolution of the
threshold issue of qualified immunity abridges this right. Additionally, the
problem cannot be solved if courts take the position that Rule 26(a)(1) will
apply in all cases unless the defendant makes a motion for a protective order.
Requiring defendants to seek a protective order is itself burdensome on the
substantive right. Furthermore, this position places too much discretion in the
hands of the court so that if a protective order is not issued the defendant's
substantive right in qualified immunity will still be abridged. Finally, adopting
a position which requires plaintiffs in § 1983 actions to ask the court for
permission to allow the rule to apply is too burdensome for the plaintiff, who
already has to carry the burden of proof. Furthermore, it would be unfair for
plaintiffs to have to prove to the court that Rule 26(a)(1) should apply since
plaintiffs may not have the necessary facts to make this kind of showing.
What should courts do in this kind of situation? The best solution is
prevention. If the federal rule could be written with exceptions in place, the
task for the courts would be easier; however, it is impossible to foresee all the
situations in which the rule would not apply. Moreover, rules are written to
apply to all types of cases under our trans-substantive system. The hardest
position to take would be to invalidate the rule given the Supreme Court's
position on this issue in Sibbach and Hanna. Thus, lower courts should try to
uphold the federal rule to accomodate the interest of litigants and to preserve
the integrity of the federal rules. In Douglas v. NCNB Texas National Bank,2 07 the
Fifth Circuit found implicit in Hanna that a court must not apply a federal rule
of civil procedure to a particular case if it affects a substantive right in violation
of the Rules Enabling Act.208 In this case the court found that since Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 13(a) abridged lenders' substantive rights to elect judicial
203Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions,
23 GA. L. REV. 597, 601 (1989).
204751 F.2d 1472 (1985).
2051d. at 1479.
206Mitcheill, 472 U.S. at 526.
207979 F.2d 1128 (1992).
2081d. at 1129.
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foreclosure, the rule would have no application. 20 9 Similarly, federal courts
should also refuse to apply Rule 26(a)(1) to § 1983 actions against individual
defendants since their substantive rights will be affected not only by a strict
application of the rule, but also in situations where the court may not apply the
rule if the defendant motions for a protective order. The following section is
included to illustrate how federal courts may consider applying different rules
for different types of cases since the uniform system of procedure that was once
intended by the drafters of the federal rules no longer exists.
VI. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE RULES
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and
the code pleading system, procedural rules were based entirely upon the writ
system.210 Under the writ system, an action was instituted when the court
issued the appropriate writ ordering a defendant to appear in court and defend
the action.211 The writ system was non-trans-substantive as each cause of action
required its own writ with its own procedural rules.212 State courts, rejecting
the writ system, began to adopt the code approach, which required the
application of a uniform set of rules to all cases, regardless of the type of claim.
The federal courts followed with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938.
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically attempted
to address the problem of "balkanization,' 213 created by this earlier highly
technical procedural system,214 by devising a code of civil procedure that
would prescribe the same procedure215 for almost all federal cases in the federal
2 091d.
2 10JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 237 (1985).
211Id.
212Id.
213Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24
ARIz. ST. L. J. 1393 n.1 (1992) (defining balkanization as "the fragmentation of federal
civil procedure, which is manifested more specifically in the increasingly disuniform
and complex nature of the procedural system").
214See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-21, 926-73 (1987).
215 Proponents of the Rules Enabling Act when advocating a system of uniform
procedural rules argued that the alleged disuniformity caused the following
inefficiencies: 1. confusion regarding whether to conform to state or federal procedure;
2. the time and expense of appealing these decisions; 3. cost to clients especially those
clients engaged in interstate commerce who had to retain different lawyers in different
federal courts. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989).
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courts. 216 The debate over whether the rules should be trans-substantive
217
seems to be moot given the increase in different procedural rules for various
categories of cases since the mid-1970s, 218 especially through the proliferation
of local rules, the Civil Justice Reform Act, and the passage of Rule 26(a)(1) with
its "opt out" provision.
Professor Robert Cover has perhaps most incisively expressed the criticism
against a uniform or trans-substantive application of the rules.219 He argues
that "[t]he fine tuning of remedial and procedural instruments for
implementing substantive preferences... is severely retarded once procedural
norms are codified in a trans-substantive structure. 22 0 Professor Cover's
critique of the federal rules contemplates a separate set of rules for civil rights
cases, antitrust cases, negligence cases, and environmental class action cases.22 1
According to Professor Stephen Subrin, the issue of advocating or not
advocating trans-substantive procedure has already been resolved "[a]s the
exploration of local and state variations has suggested, non-trans-substantive
procedure is already here."222
The proliferation of local rules,223 the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform
Act, and the passage of Rule 26 have contributed to a non-trans-substantive
procedural system. The original purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
83,224 permitting local rules not inconsistent with the federal rules, was to meet
216 Tobias, supra note 213, at 1396.
2 17Subrin, supra note 215, at 2001 n.13. Trans-substantive as used here means applying
the same set of procedural rules, namely the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to a
myriad of substantive claims.
2 18 Tobias, supra note 213, at 1396.
219Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2244 (1989).
220Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 732 (1975). But see Hazard, supra note 219, at 2244 (arguing that the
trans-substantive critique expoused by Professor Cover "overstates the reach of the
Federal Rules and underestimates the technical and political difficulties of trying to
tailor procedures to specific controversies"); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose
ofManifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067 (concluding that non-trans-substantive
rulemaking should be rejected).
22 1Cover, supra note 220, at 732.
222 Subrin, supra note 215, at 2048.
223Id.
22 4The entire text of FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (1992) is as follows:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to
comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. A local rule so adopted shall take effect upon the date
specified by the district court and shall remain in effect unless amended
by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in
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local conditions and fill in gaps not covered by the federal rules.225 In the fifty
years since the promulgation of the federal rules, the number of local rules has
proliferated at an alarming rate.22 6 One reason behind the vast number of local
rules is the sheer increase in the number of cases in federal court, and the
increased complexity of cases, which the drafters of the federal rules could not
have possibly anticipated.22 7 All local rules are not inconsistent with the notion
of a trans-substantive system; however, those local rules which fashion
procedure differently for particular types of cases are inconsistent with a
trans-substantive system. In 1985, the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the United States Judicial Conference conducted a massive study
of local rules22 8 in ninety-four federal district courts. In 1988, the Committee
presented the results of the Local Rules Project finding that the ninety-four
districts have approximately five thousand local rules.22 9 Some local rules230
fashion procedure differently for particular types of cases suggesting the move
toward non-trans-substantive rules governing civil litigation.23 1 In the area of
discovery, for example, according to the results of the Local Rules Project, six
federal district courts limit initial discovery in class action suits to facts
pertaining to the class certification requirements. 23 2 Two federal district courts
only allow pro se civil rights plaintiffs to engage in discovery if the judge, in
his discretion, and after a showing of good cause grants leave to do so, but not
otherwise.23 3 Similar non-trans-substantive local rules also exist for cases
dealing with various types of topics such as social security, black lung,
naturalization, bankruptcy, and admiralty.234 In § 1983 civil rights cases many
which the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made by
any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the judicial
council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and be
made available to the public. In all cases not provided for by [the] rule, the
district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
225Subrin, supra note 215, at 2013.
226Id. at 2018.
2271d.
228 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT pt. I, at 1, 4 (Ten. Draft Dec. 31, 1988)
[hereinafter LOCAL RULES PROJECT].
22 91d. at 1.
23 0See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments:A Study in the Division of Power,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991) (describing the advantages and disadvantages of local
rules made pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 83).
2 31Subrin, supra note 215, at 2025.
2320d.
233ld.
234Id. at 2026 n.135.
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federal district courts require that the complaint be verified which stands
directly at odds with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 235
Additionally, some courts require a heightened pleading standard, 236 by either
judicial decision or local rule, which is directly contrary to Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules.237 The Local Rules Project reported that in pro se cases, thirty-two
districts "have local rules requiring civil rights actions to be filed on standard
forms available from the court.'2 8 The Committee found these local rules to
be inconsistent with the federal rules, and recommended that the rules be
rescinded. 239 Thus, the proliferation of local rules has contributed to a
non-trans-substantive procedural system.
The Civil Justice Reform Act will also increase the divergence from a single
set of rules for all cases to a non-trans-substantive system. Under the directives
of the Civil Justice Reform Act, each district must consider six principles and
guidelines.240 Most of these principles foster intercase procedural
disuniformity.241 The first principle that district courts are required to consider
is a system of differentiated judicial management tailored to the needs of
various cases.242 Under the Judicial Conference's Model Plan, 243 the
differentiated case management system incorporates a five track plan with the
following tracks: expedited,244 standard, 245 complex, 246 administrative,247 and
23 SLevin, supra note 230, at 1580.
236 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (rejecting the application of a strict pleading requirement in § 1983
actions in federal court, but leaving open the question of whether heightened pleading
could be required by state courts in § 1983 suits).
23 7Levin, supra note 230, at 1581 n.49.
238Id.
239Id.
240Tobias, supra note 213, at 1418.
24 1Id.
242Id.
243 Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Peaceful Co-Existence?, in A.L.I. A.B.A. VIDEO LAW
REVIEW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 465, 480-81 (Sol
Schreiber ed., Dec. 9,1993).
244 The Civil Justice Reform Act Model Plan's Expedited Track is as follows:
Cases on the Expedited Track shall be completed within nine (9) months
or less after filing, and shall have a discovery cut-off no later than one-
hundred (100) days after filing of the [case management plan] ("CMI'").
Discovery guidelines for this track include interrogatories limited to
fifteen (15) single-part questions, no more than one (1) fact witness depo-
sition per party without prior approval of the court, and such other
discovery, if any, as may be provided for in the CMP.
Id. at 480.
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mass tort.248 Each case will be placed on a track and be subject to different
procedural guidelines. The Civil Justice Reform Act also requires each court to
consider the use of case management conferences in complex cases to monitor
discovery, among other things.249 Courts may also consider alternate dispute
resolution for certain types of cases.250
In the Eastern District of New York, for example, the expense and delay
reduction plan for the district, incorporates a differential case management or
tracking system. 251 The basic structure of the tracking system requires a judicial
officer to designate cases as either standard or complex.252 Under the district's
plan, a special arbitration track exists for cases involving damages of
one-hundred thousand dollars or less. 253 However, local rule prevents certain
cases from being designated to the arbitration track such as social security,
prisoner, constitutional, and civil rights cases.254 The expense and delay
reduction plan also incorporates a specialized track for habeas corpus and
245The Standard Track is as follows:
Cases on the Standard Track shall be completed within fifteen (15) months
or less after filing, and shall have a discovery cut-off no later than two-
hundred (200) days after filing of the CMP. Discovery guidelines for this
track include interrogatories limited to thirty-five (35) single-part questions,
no more than three (3) fact witness depositions per party without prior
approval of the court, and such other discovery, if any, as may be provided
for in the CMP.
Id. at 481.
246 The Complex Track is as follows:
Cases on the Complex Track shall have the discovery cut-off established
in CMP and shall have a case completion goal of not more than twenty-
four (24) months.
Id.
247 The Administrative Track is as follows:
Cases on the Administrative Track shall be referred by court personnel
directly to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. Discovery
guidelines for this track include no discovery without prior leave of court,
and such cases shall normally be determined on the pleadings or by motion.
Cavanagh, supra note 243, at 481.
248 The Mass Tort Track is as follows:
Cases on the Mass Tort Track shall be treated in accordance with the
special management plan adopted by the court.
Id.
249 Tobias, supra note 213, at 1418-19.
2501d. at 1419.
25 1Heller, supra note 97, at 527.
252 /d.
253 Id. at 528.
2541d.
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social security cases.255 The Eastern District of New York also has a mandatory
disclosure provision for all cases except social security, habeas corpus, civil
rights cases, in which an immunity defense is available, government forfeiture
cases, and pro se matters.2 56
Rule 26(a)(1) will also add to the increasing trend towards a
non-trans-substantive system. The mandatory disclosure provision establishes
a default provision, also known as the "opt out" provision, which district courts
may choose to ignore if the district has its own procedures for discovery.257
When district courts adopt differing standards of disclosure and exempt certain
types of cases from the disclosure requirement, as in the Eastern District of New
York, there will be an increase in non-trans-substantive rulemaking.
Critics of non-trans-substantive procedural rules argue that transaction costs
increase under this system, and that different procedures for different cases
render procedure too political.258 Transaction costs will increase as attorneys
will argue about which category is appropriate for the case, and clients will pay
the costs associated with a judicial decision.259 Critics of non-trans-substantive
rules also argue that different rules for different cases will become politicized,
and lead to advantages for those litigants who lobby for procedural
rulemaking.260
Although there is no movement to return to the writ system, there is a
definite trend towards sculpting different procedural rules for different
cases.261 Perhaps Professor Subrin has stated the future of procedure best:
History teaches that any American procedural model will be modified
by the ingenuity of lawyers who have learned to manipulate the rules
to the benefit of their clients. Non-trans-substantive procedure cannot
avoid a similar fate. Fifty years from now critics will surely complain
that some of us who could see the flaws of generality, flexibility, and
discretion were blind to the inefficiencies and injustices of linedrawing.
We will just as surely be accused of undervaluing equity in the fruitless
search for certainty.2
62
2 551d. at 528.
256 Cavanagh, supra note 243, at 474.
25 7Robert P. Taylor & Deborah M. Lerner, Proposed Anwndnwnts to Rules 16, 26, 30, 31,
and 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in A.L.I. A.B.A. VIDEO LAW REVIEW: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 229, 236 n.9 (Sol Schreiber ed.,
Dec. 9, 1993).
258 Subrin, supra note 215, at 2049-50.
259/d. at 2049.
2601d. at 2050.
2611d. at 2048-49.
2621d. at 2051.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to familiarize the reader with the problems
associated with the application of Rule 26(a)(1), which will continue to surface
as the courts struggle to implement the mandatory disclosure provision. The
note has also attempted to demonstrate, through the application of mandatory
disclosure in § 1983 cases, how a strict application of Rule 26(a)(1) in all cases
may be inappropriate. If the defendant's qualified immunity right in § 1983
cases is substantive in nature, then courts may protect this right by exempting
these cases from the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1) in order to both save the rule
and satisfy the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act. Courts may also find
that a strict application of mandatory disclosure may be inappropriate in other
types of cases as well.263 District courts should respond by exempting
inappropriate cases from mandatory disclosure as the trans-substantive system
envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer
exists. SHILPA SHAH
263 1n addition to § 1983 cases, there are other types of cases in which immunities may
apply.
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